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TORT LIABILITY OF PARENT
fect on union activities would be the same. Such a result would
be unfortunate.
Management has also benefited from the present decision in
that an employer has the right to cease doing business entirely for
any reason whatsoever. This right was held to be absolute, for to
hold otherwise "would represent such a startling innovation that it
should not be entertained without the dearest manifestation of legis-
lative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent ... '22 Such a de-
cision is in keeping with the fundamental concepts of American free
enterprise.
DAvID R. WILLIAMS
PARENT AND CHILD - TORT LIABILITY OF PARENT TO
UNEMANCIPATED CHILD
Teramano v. Teramano, 1 Ohio App. 2d 504,
205 N.E.2d 586 (1965).
N 1891, a Mississippi court established, for the first time in the
United States, a rule insulating parents from personal tort actions
brought by their children.' In Hewlett v. George,2 the court held,
without reference to existing authority, that public policy forbade
a cause of action by a child against his parent for a personal tort.
In 1903, a Tennessee court, followed Hewlett v. George and ex-
panded this doctrine, adding erroneously that there was a common-
law rule forbidding a personal injury action by a child against his
parent.'
Despite its doubtful basis, the theory that an unemancipated
minor child has no cause of action against a parent for negligence
has been generally accepted in a majority of American jurisdictions.4
Recently, however, several inroads have been made to limit the
strict rule set forth in Hewlett. In most jurisdictions, an exception
has been made to the no-suit rule for an injury to a child result-
ing from a willful or malicious tort committed by the parent.5
A second exception has been adopted where a child is injured while
221d. at 270.
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the parent is acting within the scope of his vocation.6 This trend to
ameliorate the harsh effects of the non-liability rule has, however,
been limited. Perhaps one of the limiting factors is the frequent
implication that a great deal of discretion must be accorded to par-
ents in developing a course of conduct for the growth of their child.7
Thus, an injury to the child resulting from negligence on the part
of the parent, while in the discharge of parental duties, has been
held insufficient to support a cause of action!
In the Ohio Court of Appeals case of Teramano v. Teramano,9
the plaintiff, a minor child, was injured when struck by his father's
car. The complaint alleged that the father, while intoxicated, en-
tered the driveway at a high rate of speed, knowing that the drive-
way served as a popular means of ingress and egress from the back
door of the house. On appeal from the trial court's judgment
directing a verdict for the defendant father, the Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeals held that a complaint by a minor child alleging
willful misconduct on the part of the parent stated a valid
cause of action."0 Further, the court said that such activity could
in no way be related to the father's duties as a parent. In recogniz-
1Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
2 Ibid.
3McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903). It should be
pointed out, however, that Hewlett did not mention the existence of a common law
rule permitting such an action. On the contrary, there is authority that such an action
for personal tort was recognized at common law. See, e.g., McCurdy, Torts Between
Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L REV. 1030, 1056 (1930).
4 PROSSER, TORTS § 101 (2d ed. 1955); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951). See
also Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939). The Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals pointed out that the immunity rule, arising from a disability to sue
and not from a lack of a violated duty, is at most a qualified privilege.
5 Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Nudd v. Matsoukas,
7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Leggett v. Leggett, 216 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sup. Ct.
1961); Decker v. Decker, 20 Misc. 2d 438, 193 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Hen-
derson v. Henderson, 11 Misc. 2d 449, 169 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Cowgill v.
Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950). Contra, Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242,
79 Pac. 788 (1905).
6 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ad. 905 (1930); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio
St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743, modified, 161 Ohio St. 241, 118 NE.2d 411 (1953); Wor-
rell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 SXE.2d 343 (1939); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642,
251 P.2d 149 (1962); 6 OHIo JU1. 2d Automobiles § 256 (1954).
7 Signs v. Signs, supra note 6; Borst v. Borst, supra note 6. See McCurdy, supra
note 3, at 1078.
8 See, e.g., Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
9 Teramano v. Teramano, 1 Ohio App. 2d 504, 205 N.E2d 586 (1965).
10 Id. at 510, 205 N.E.2d at 590. The court reasoned that the father who was driv-
ing while intoxicated was guilty of willful misconduct. Ibid.
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ing the cause of action, the court was careful to define the requisites
necessary for removal of the parental "veil of immunity" by limiting
the definition of willful misconduct to the facts involved in each
case. 1 Recognizing the need for parental discretion in controlling
children, the court limited the decision by pointing out that mere
negligence on the part of a parent will not sustain a cause of action.'"
This decision enlarges the doctrine propounded by the earlier
Ohio Supreme Court decision of Signs v. Signs,'3 which for the first
time in Ohio indicated that the "mantle of immunity" disappears
when the child is injured by the parent who is pursuing a non-
parental activity. Thus, by means of these two decisions, Ohio has
aligned itself with the majority of other jurisdictions which recognize
the existence of a cause of action on the part of a minor child for
injuries resulting from the willful negligence of the parent.'4
There are many arguments against permitting a cause of action
by a child against his parent.' In Teramano, it was argued that
allowing a child to recover would lead to collusion or fraud. The
court answered this argument by drawing an analogy to the Ohio
guest statute'" which was passed by the legislature to prevent
"friendly" suits. The court argued that if the parent is to be im-
mune from suit, such immunity must be granted by the legislature.
11 
"It is well known that *willful misconduct depends upon the facts of a particular
case and necessarily involves deliberate, intentional or wanton conduct in doing or omit.
ting to do something, with knowledge or appreciation of the fact that danger is likely
to result therefrom." Ibid.
121d. at 509, 205 N.E.2d at 589-90.
's Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743, modified, 161 Ohio St. 241,
118 N.E.2d 411 (1953). Plaintiff, a minor child, was injured while playing in his
front yard when his father's gasoline pump caught fire. See 6 OHIo Jus. 2d Auto-
mobiles § 256 (1954).
14Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Nudd v. Matsou-
kas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Leggett v. Leggett, 216 N.Y.S.2d 781
(Sup. Ct. 1961); Decker v. Decker, 20 MAisc. 2d 438, 193 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct.
1959); Henderson v. Henderson, 11 Misc. 2d 449, 169 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950). Contra, Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
15The specific arguments against permitting this cause of action have been dis-
cussed and criticized in a number of cases and legal works. See, e.g., Borst v. Borst, 41
Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); PROSSER, ToRTs § 101 (2d ed. 1955).
16 OHIo REV. CODE § 4515.02 - the Ohio guest statute - was enacted to prevent
"friendly" suits against drivers by guest passengers injured in an accident. The suit
'usually developed between opposing insurance companies, with plaintiff-guest and de-
fendant-driver as friendly onlookers. The court in the instant case quoting Signs, said
that "if the legislative branch of the government should be of the opinion that the dan-
ger of collusion or fraud is an evil which outweighs the desirability of the right to re-
dress of an unemancipated child for a tort committed by his parent it could abolish
that right by legislative enactment." Teramano v. Teramano, 1 Ohio App. 2d 504,
508, 205 N.E.2d 586, 589 (1965).
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In order to avoid "friendly" suits which might result in substantial
losses to the parent's insurance company, three jurisdictions have re-
fused to recognize the immunity rule where public liability or in-
demnity insurance was present." However, most jurisdictions, de-
sirous of encouraging an impartial verdict, have consistently refused
to allow any mention of insurance at the trial. Nevertheless, in-
surance companies, wary of collusion or fraud, have adequately pro-
tected themselves by providing in their policies a disclaimer pro-
vision for actions among family members."8
The court in Teramano, after citing the decision in Signs, sum-
marized the judicial desire to provide an adequate remedy for all
injuries incurred, whether among family members or not, when it
stated:
It seems absurd to say that it is legal and proper for an uneman-
cipated child to bring an action against his parent concerning the
child's property rights yet to be utterly without redress with refer-
ence to injury to his person.
It is difficult to understand by what legerdemain of reason,
logic or law such a situation can exist or how it can be said that
domestic harmony would be undisturbed in one case and be upset
in the other.19
Through the expansion of the Signs holding in the Teramano de-
cision the significance of this long-neglected area of tort law has
been recognized in Ohio.
JoHN B. LINDAMOOD
17 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ad. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell,
174 Va. 11,4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Luck v. Luck, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
'
8 Terarnano v. Teramano, 1 Ohio App. 2d 504, 508-09, 205 N.B.2d 586, 589
(1965).
191d. at 508, 205 N.E.2d at 589.
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